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TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING:  
CAMPAIGN SPEECH AFTER CITIZENS UNITED
Molly J. Walker Wilson*
If individuals in our society had infinite free time to listen to and 
contemplate every last bit of speech uttered by anyone, anywhere; 
and if broadcast advertisements had no special ability to influence 
elections apart from the merits of their arguments (to the extent they 
make any) . . . then I suppose the majority’s premise [in Citizen’s 
United] would be sound. 
—Associate Justice John Paul Stevens1
INTRODUCTION
In January 2010, the Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission2 overturned Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce3 and the portion of McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission4 that restricted independent corporate expenditures, as 
codified in section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA).5  Specifically, Citizens United invalidated laws forbidding 
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for 
“electioneering communication,” political advocacy transmitted by 
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication in the period leading up to 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  J.D., University of 
Virginia; Ph.D., University of Virginia.  Thanks to Jeanne Murray Walker and E. Daniel Larkin 
for research support in the early stages of this project.
1 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 975 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
2 Id. at 886. 
3 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
4 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
5 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886 (“Federal law prohibits corporations and unions from 
using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an 
‘electioneering communication’ or for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a 
candidate . . . .  Limits on electioneering communications were upheld in McConnell v. Federal 
Election Comm’n.” (internal citations omitted)).  Section 203 of BCRA, also known as the 
“McCain-Feingold Act,” prevents corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for 
“electioneering communications,” a term that refers to advocacy transmitted by broadcast, cable, 
or satellite communication where the message promotes or criticizes a candidate running for 
federal office in the thirty-day period leading up to a primary and sixty-day period prior to a 
general election.  2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006). 
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a federal election.6  In reporting the decision, The New York Times
called Citizens United “a sharp doctrinal shift [having] major political 
and practical consequences [that would] reshape the way elections were 
conducted.”7  The opinion drew immediate attention at the highest level.  
President Barack Obama was highly critical of the result, calling it “a 
major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies 
and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in 
Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.”8
Some were pleased by the ruling, lauding the lifting of a ban on 
corporate political spending as a victory for freedom of speech.9  An 
amicus brief filed for the Chamber of Commerce stated that Austin’s
ban on corporate spending was “impossible to reconcile with basic First 
Amendment principles.”10  For advocates of stricter campaign finance 
regulations, the ruling was distressing.  Former general counsel of the 
Federal Election Commission Lawrence M. Noble worried publicly that 
lobbyists would gain leverage with a simple threat aimed at lawmakers: 
“We have got a million we can spend advertising for you or against 
you—whichever one you want.”11  Retired Supreme Court Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor was tacitly critical of the ruling, responding to 
questions by referencing her own (coauthored) opinion in McConnell,12
6 Section 203 of BCRA amended 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) to prohibit any “electioneering 
communication,” which is defined as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that 
“refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” and is made within thirty days of a 
primary or sixty days of a general election.  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (citing 2 U.S.C. 
§ 434(f)(3)(A)). 
7 See Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 
2010, at A1. 
8 Id.  So profound was President Obama’s concern that he addressed the Justices directly 
during a portion of his State of the Union Address, predicting that the Court’s holding would 
“open the floodgates for special interests, including foreign corporations, to spend without limit 
in our elections.”  He went on to assert that American elections might now be “bankrolled by 
America’s most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities.”  See Mary Hall, State of the 
Union: Obama Walking in the Footsteps of FDR, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-hall/state-of-the-union-obama_b_447056.html. 
9 According to Jan Witold Baran, “[t]he greatest benefit of Citizens United is that it will 
restrain Congress from flooding us with arcane, burdensome, convoluted campaign laws that 
discourage political participation.”  Jan W. Baran, Op-Ed., Stampede Toward Democracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, at A23.  Baran is the author of the book, The Election Law Primer for 
Corporations, and filed an amicus brief on behalf of Citizens United.  See infra note 10. 
10 See Supp. Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Appellant at 3, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205).  “Suppression has been imposed 
even when candidates have directly attacked business interests and when corporations have 
unique and valuable insight into the likely consequences of electing or defeating particular 
candidates.  Although this Court has protected the ability of corporations to discuss ‘issues,’ that 
is no substitute for direct and explicit speech about candidates.” Id.
11 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in Campaign Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 22, 2010, at A1. 
12 See Posting of Adam Liptak to The Caucus, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com (Jan. 26, 
2010, 14:05 EST).  Justice O’Connor stated, “If you want my legal opinion, you can go read 
[McConnell].”  Id.  Speaking at a keynote address at a Georgetown Law School conference, 
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the decision that was struck down by Citizens United.13  Current Justice 
John Paul Stevens had a less nuanced response, penning a scathing,  
ninety-page dissent—asserting, among other things, that “[o]ur 
lawmakers have a compelling constitutional basis, if not also a 
democratic duty, to take measures designed to guard against the 
potentially deleterious effects of corporate spending in local and 
national races.”14
Campaign finance jurisprudence is complex because the Court has 
incrementally modified congressional legislation in a piecemeal 
fashion,15 and in sometimes contradictory and perplexing ways.  
Relatively speaking, the Citizens United opinion was refreshingly 
simple.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reiterated several 
previously established principles, namely that money is protected 
speech, and campaign funding restrictions must be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest.16  The opinion also reiterated the 
notion that corruption and the appearance of corruption are the only 
legitimate interests justifying interference with campaign spending.17
The ruling did not disturb existing regulations on direct campaign 
contributions (as opposed to independent expenditures), which the 
Court has upheld based on the rationale that contributions may result in 
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.  Against the 
backdrop of these principles, the Court directly confronted the question 
of whether corporate independent campaign expenditures may be 
regulated.18  The majority answered in the negative, and in doing so, 
established a new rule that no “person”—even when that “person” is a 
legal fiction—may be subject to independent campaign spending 
restrictions.19
Justice O’Connor offered predictions about a post-Citizens United election: “I think today we can 
anticipate that labor unions and trial lawyers, for instance, might have the financial means to win 
one particular state judicial election. And maybe tobacco firms and energy companies have 
enough to win the next one. And if both sides unleash their campaign spending monies without 
restrictions, then I think mutually assured destruction is the most likely outcome.”  Id. 
13 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975. 
14 Id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
15 The lack of comprehensiveness may result from the Court’s practice of deciding cases on 
the narrowest possible of grounds. 
16 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896-900.  Statutory classifications impinging upon First 
Amendment rights must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.  Id. at 
898.  
17 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908. 
18 Given the Court’s charge to address questions as narrowly as possible, significant 
commentary has focused on the appropriateness of the majority’s decision to treat the issue before 
the Court as a facial as opposed to an as-applied challenge.  Although this is an interesting and 
important question, it is beyond the scope of this Article. 
19 In his scathing dissent, Justice Stevens summarizes the majority opinion this way: 
First, the Court claims that Austin and McConnell have ‘banned’ corporate speech.  
Second, it claims that the First Amendment precludes regulatory distinctions based on 
speaker identity, including the speaker’s identity as a corporation.  Third, it claims that 
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The effect of Citizens United was to protect the right of 
corporations, no less than individual American citizens, to fund and 
distribute political advocacy.  It would appear that this right is also 
preserved for unions, although the opinion specifically addressed 
corporations.  The Citizens United holding is controversial for many 
reasons, not the least of which is that it takes a hard-line approach that 
unapologetically privileges speech, even while tacitly acknowledging 
the potential for negative effects.  For example, Justice Kennedy cites 
with approval a concurrence from an earlier campaign finance case 
arguing that “any ‘undue influence’ generated by a speaker’s ‘large 
expenditures’ was outweighed ‘by the loss for democratic processes 
resulting from the restrictions upon free and full public discussion.’”20
Almost simultaneously with the issuance of the Citizens United
opinion, Cardozo Law Review published Behavioral Decision Theory 
and Implications for the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance 
Jurisprudence (hereinafter Behavioral Campaigns),21 in which I applied 
behavioral science to examine the effects of strategic campaign 
messaging on voter behavior.22  The article highlighted empirical 
findings illustrating the potential for independent spending not only to 
change voters’ choices, but also to alter the manner in which they form 
judgments.  I argued that there is a nexus between campaign spending, 
manipulative communication, and distorted (sub-optimal) voting 
decisions.23  I proposed a new definition of “corruption,” which 
encompasses an understanding of the vital governmental interest in 
limiting campaign spending in order to minimize large-scale 
coordinated efforts to manipulate voters’ choices.24  The Citizens United
opinion purports to settle a question that is far from settled—in fact, 
behavioral science casts serious doubt upon the correctness of the 
majority’s conclusions.  I rearticulate my earlier argument here, with a 
fresh sense of urgency.  The majority’s reasoning in Citizens United, as 
explained below, provides an additional rationale for my claim. 
This Article challenges the Citizens United decision on several 
grounds.  First, I dispute the majority’s claim that corporate spending 
does not result in “corruption.”  Second, I assert that the potential for 
Austin and McConnell were radical outliers in our First Amendment tradition and our 
campaign finance jurisprudence.  Each of these claims is wrong. 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
20 Id. at 901 (citing United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143 (1948)). 
21 Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme 
Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679 (2010) [hereinafter 
Behavioral Campaigns]. 
22 By “strategic,” I mean communication that is designed to capitalize upon some identified 
feature of human choice-formation.  Strategic communication goes beyond straightforward 
attempts at persuasion through exchange of information and ideas.  See, e.g., id. at 680. 
23 Id. at 679. 
24 Id. at 683-84. 
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corruption poses a real and serious threat to democratic elections and 
that preventing this corruption is therefore a vital governmental interest 
justifying restraints on “speech.”  Finally, I adopt the majority’s free 
speech priority and propose that even if the First Amendment is the only 
legitimate consideration, corporate spending is harmful because it chills 
speech in a manner not contemplated by the Court.  My claim relies on 
evidence from behavioral science and accepts all of the precepts 
adopted by the majority—that corporations are persons for campaign 
speech purposes,25 that corporations are entitled to strong First 
Amendment protection, and that the only legitimate interest justifying 
interference is corruption or the appearance of corruption.26  Without 
discounting any of these suppositions, I make the case that the Court 
wrongly decided Citizens United.  In doing so, I advance an 
understanding of “corruption” and free speech that is enlightened by 
conclusions of behavioral science on the interplay between campaign 
spending and human judgment. 
Before getting to the heart of the interest at stake in Citizens 
United, it may prove helpful to dispense with several ancillary but 
critical issues.  These include how corporations are treated, how 
campaign spending is treated, and relatedly, the level of analysis to 
which restrictions on campaign spending are subject.  Although the 
analogy “money is speech” is not without controversy, the Court long 
ago established the expressive function of funds.27  Because campaign 
spending is viewed as a means of expressing support and 
communicating ideas, this activity is granted First Amendment 
protection.28  As a form of political communication, campaign spending 
is subject to close examination, although there has been some question 
of whether such communication is subject to strict scrutiny.29  In order 
to justify interference with spending for political advocacy, the Court 
must be satisfied that any proposed limitation serves an important 
governmental interest and that the limitation is narrowly tailored to 
effectuate that interest.30
Of course, in order to be entitled to protection under the First 
25 While I accept this precept generally, I also agree with Justice Stevens’ assessment that 
“the Court dramatically overstates its critique of identity-based distinctions, without ever 
explaining why corporate identity demands the same treatment as individual identity.”  Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
26 The interest of preventing the “appearance of corruption” is not directly relevant to my 
claim; therefore, it is not discussed further in this Article. 
27 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court noted that contribution and expenditure limitations “operate 
in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities” in that “[d]iscussion of public 
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of 
government established by our Constitution.”  424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). 
28 Id.
29 See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
30 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. 
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Amendment, the speaker must be a “person” entitled to protection.31
The majority in Citizens United held that when it comes to campaign 
spending, corporations should have the same rights as individual 
citizens.32  Kennedy defended this extension of the campaign speech 
right on the ground that corporations are “persons.”33  While it is true 
that a variety of legal contexts have treated corporations as persons,34
corporations have a long history of being disadvantaged in the 
campaign finance realm.35  Restrictions on corporate spending have 
been justified on the grounds that corporations have special 
characteristics and are entitled to fewer rights than natural persons, 
points that Justice Stevens made during the oral arguments of Citizens 
United.36  Both the scope of protection appropriate for corporate 
31 The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
32 “The Court today rejects a century of history when it treats the distinction between 
corporate and individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born of Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).”  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 930 
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
33  Kennedy repeatedly refers to corporations as persons in making the point that no “person” 
should be deprived of the right to speak and advocate for a political candidate.  Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. at 928-29. 
34 Treatment of the corporate form as a “person” is famously attributed to a reporter’s note in 
County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), in which Chief 
Justice Waite was quoted prior to oral argument as stating: “The court does not wish to hear 
argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of [the] opinion that it does.”  
Corporations have also been treated as persons for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Railroad and Warehouse Commission, 134 
U.S. 418, 456-57 (1890). 
35 At the federal level, the express distinction between corporate and individual political 
spending on elections stretches back to 1907, when Congress passed the Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 
Stat. 864, banning all corporate contributions to candidates.  The Senate Report on the legislation 
observed that “[t]he evils of the use of [corporate] money in connection with political elections 
are so generally recognized that the committee deems it unnecessary to make any argument in 
favor of the general purpose of this measure.  It is in the interest of good government and 
calculated to promote purity in the selection of public officials.”  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 
952-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. NO. 59-3056, at 2 (1906)). 
36 Stevens inquired, “[b]ut if there is a compelling government—can there be any case in 
which there is a different treatment of corporations and individuals in your judgment?”  Mr. 
Olson replied, “I would not rule that out, Justice Stevens. I mean, there may be.  I can’t imagine 
all of the infinite varieties of potential problems that might exist, but—but we would eventually 
come back to the narrow tailoring problem anyway.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Citizens 
United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/08-205.pdf (referring to the strict scrutiny notion that the government must 
have a compelling interest and must have a narrowly tailored rule that effectuates that interest). 
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campaign spending and the potential for harm due to the particular 
characteristics of corporations relate to the governmental interest at 
stake: Preventing corruption in the context of democratic elections.
The prevention of corruption is not the only interest advanced to 
justify restrictions on campaign spending, but it is the single interest 
(along with a corresponding prevention of the appearance of such 
corruption) consistently upheld by the Court as sufficient to justify 
restrictions on campaign funding.  “Quid pro quo” corruption, defined 
as “the buying of political influence,” has been most persuasive; the 
Court has upheld restrictions on campaign contributions under this 
rationale.37  Independent expenditure limits, on the other hand, have 
been struck down because they “restrict the quantity of campaign 
speech by individuals, groups, and candidates,” and expenditures are 
ostensibly less likely to give rise to corruption.38
Two Supreme Court cases dealing with corporate spending have 
reached seemingly different results.  The first is First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti,39 in which the Court found unconstitutional a 
Massachusetts law limiting corporations’ participation in ballot measure 
campaigns.  In determining that the law improperly abridged the First 
Amendment right to free speech, the Court claimed that “the fact that 
advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress 
it.”40  However, a footnote in Bellotti read, “Congress might well be 
able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or apparent 
corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence 
candidate elections.”41  This footnote left the door open for a closer 
look, suggesting that corporate independent expenditures potentially 
could be shown to cause corruption. 
Twelve years after Bellotti was decided, the Court heard Austin v. 
Michigan Chamber of Commerce,42 a case in which the plaintiffs were 
challenging a Michigan law that prohibited non-media corporations 
from spending general treasury funds on advocacy related to state 
election campaigns.  The Austin Court envisioned a different brand of 
corruption in elections: “[T]he corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of 
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s 
37 The Court first articulated its acceptance of contribution limits in Buckley v. Valeo, noting 
that “the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined” when large 
contributions are given to secure “political quid pro quo from current and potential office 
holders,” as shown by the examples that surfaced after the 1972 election.  424 U.S. 1, 26-27 
(1976). 
38 See id. at 39. 
39 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
40 Id. at 790. 
41 Id. at 788 n.26. 
42 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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support for the corporation’s political ideas.”43  The Austin Court upheld 
spending limits for corporations and unions.  The holding in Austin was 
reaffirmed in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,44 a case that 
challenged the constitutionality of BCRA.45  The McConnell Court 
found a governmental interest in preventing “both the actual corruption 
threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public 
confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of 
corruption.”46  In McConnell, the Court held that section 323 of BCRA 
“does little more than regulate the ability of wealthy individuals, 
corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence 
federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders.”47  In 
upholding this portion of BCRA, the McConnell Court relied on the 
antidistortion interest articulated in Austin.48
I. POST-CITIZENS UNITED ANALYSIS
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Citizens United, 
explicitly rejected Austin’s distortion rationale, finding this interest 
“unconvincing and insufficient.”49  Kennedy’s single-minded focus on 
the potential for “chilling” speech left the precise objection to the 
distortion rationale unarticulated.  In fact, the Citizens United Court 
declined to provide specific information about what type of rationale, if 
any, would justify restrictions on campaign spending.  What is clear 
from the majority opinion is that the interest on the other side of the 
equation—protection of speech—tipped the balance in favor of full 
corporate participation. 
Two related questions become important, one a question of law 
and the other a question of fact.  The question of law is whether there is 
an articulable governmental interest of sufficient importance to compete 
with the interest of corporate campaign advocacy (in the form of 
campaign spending).  The question of fact is whether there is adequate 
evidence that corporate campaign spending threatens that governmental 
interest.  In the past, the Court has asserted that in the context of 
43 Id. at 660. 
44 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. 
Ct. 876 (2010). 
45 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, 434, 
437g, 437h, 438a. 439a, 441a, 441b, 441d, 441e, 441h, 441i, 441k, 454, 455 (2006)). 
46 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 495 U.S. 
197 (1982)). 
47 Id. at 138. 
48 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (“The McConnell Court relied on the antidistortion 
interest recognized in Austin . . . .”). 
49 Id. at 913. 
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campaign finance, “[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to 
satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up 
or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.”50
The Court has also called campaign spending “a case where 
constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal 
equation;” accordingly, “there is no place for a strong presumption 
against constitutionality.”51  However, in Citizens United, Kennedy 
unhesitatingly applied strict scrutiny to the question of whether 
Congress could restrict corporate spending, making it clear that the 
current Court will require an interest that is “compelling.”52
Many argue that when a financially powerful source helps a 
candidate win an election through independent spending, this action 
curries favor with the candidate.  Others worry that the simple threat of 
corporations unleashing their resources against candidates will influence 
candidates’ policy positions.53  Kennedy appears unconcerned, quoting 
his own partial dissent from McConnell: 
Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative 
politics.  It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor 
certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and 
contributors who support those policies.  It is well understood that a 
substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to cast a 
vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate over another is 
that the candidate will respond by producing those political out-
comes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on 
responsiveness.54
He concludes that “[t]he fact that speakers may have influence over or 
access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are 
corrupt.”55  Ultimately, Kennedy seems convinced that “influence” is 
tantamount to healthy political pressure and not financial control. 
“Corruption” is therefore relegated to strict quid pro quo vote-
50 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000). 
51 Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
52 Laws that burden political speech are “subject to strict scrutiny,” which requires the 
Government to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest.”  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 882 (citing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)). 
53 For example, Monica Youn of the Brennan Center at New York University articulated: 
I think there’s going to be a threat of corporate funded attack ads against elected 
officials who dare to stand up to corporate interests.  Corporations have basically been 
handed a weapon.  And when you walk into a negotiation, and you know that one 
person is armed and is able to use a weapon against you, they don’t have to take out 
that weapon.  They don’t have to even brandish it.  You know that they have it. 
Interview by Bill Moyers with Monica Youn, The Journal (PBS television broadcast Jan. 29, 
2010) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/01292010/watch.html). 
54 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 
S. Ct. 876 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
55 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910. 
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buying, in which money is literally exchanged for political influence.  
This narrow characterization of corruption seems dangerous and naïve 
to Justice Stevens, who points out that “[c]orruption operates along a 
spectrum, and the majority’s apparent belief that quid pro quo 
arrangements can be neatly demarcated from other improper influences 
does not accord with the theory or reality of politics.”56  Justice Stevens 
is also concerned that the majority does not understand the distortion 
rationale from Austin.  He complains that “[t]he majority fails to 
appreciate that Austin’s antidistortion rationale is itself an anticorruption 
rationale . . . tied to the special concerns raised by corporations. 
Understood properly, ‘antidistortion’ is simply a variant on the classic 
governmental interest in protecting against improper influences on 
officeholders that debilitate the democratic process.”57
Although Justice Kennedy himself does not share this view, he 
acknowledges that “Congress believed that ‘differing structures and 
purposes’ of corporations and unions ‘may require different forms of 
regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process.’”58
This congressional rationale is at the heart of Austin and is reaffirmed as 
a vital interest meriting protection in McConnell.59  The majority in 
Citizens United “acknowledges the validity of the interest in preventing 
corruption,” but Justice Stevens protests that it is not an interest the 
majority understands or protects, for “it effectively discounts the value 
of that interest to zero.”60  Perhaps the majority either fails to see 
adequate evidence of corruption, or it cares so deeply about First 
Amendment protection that it cannot appreciate how any interest can 
truly compete. 
II. EVIDENCE OF FUNDING-RELATED HARM
Justice Kennedy believes that voters control the market.  He argues 
that “[t]he fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to 
spend money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people have 
the ultimate influence over elected officials.”61  His logic is sound if— 
and only if—either campaign money is spent only to convey accurate 
information and honest ideas, or if money is spent to manipulate voters, 
the attempts to manipulate are ineffective.  Justice Kennedy’s logic 
56 Id. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 970 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 903 (citing Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981). 
59 Id. (“[T]he Austin Court expressly declined to rely on a speech-equalization 
rationale . . . and we have never understood Austin to stand for such a rationale.” (citing Austin v. 
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990))). 
60 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903. 
61 Id. at 910. 
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breaks down in the face of evidence that campaign money pays for the 
strategic use of psychological tactics and evidence that voters are
swayed by such strategies.  In Behavioral Campaigns, I wrote that 
“psychological research and theory provide insight regarding the 
potential for manipulative communication to distort vote choice.”62  For 
decades, social scientists in psychology, sociology, anthropology, and 
political science have conducted empirical studies and gathered 
historical data in an attempt to glean what information they could about 
how voters make decisions.  The overwhelming evidence is that 
targeted communication strategies can profoundly influence voter 
decision-making. 
A.     The Nature of Political Appeals 
The central role of the political consultant reveals a great deal 
about the nature of campaign communication.63  As is true in other 
“markets,” polling research and campaign strategists dominate the 
political landscape.64  Political consultants are extremely costly, yet 
candidates consistently demonstrate a willingness to commit campaign 
funds to retain these professionals.65  The logic is clear: Political 
consultants supply a critical knowledge of the cognitive mechanisms 
that have been successfully exploited by marketing strategists in other 
forums.66  Campaign communication is the product of careful strategic 
planning and road testing.  Information is reduced to “sound bites” and 
is framed and disseminated in such a fashion so as to maximize impact.  
Events external to the political race are harnessed or downplayed, 
depending upon the predicted impact on public opinion of a candidate 
or issue.  As has been noted, “[p]olitics and campaigns are structured 
around how, where, and to whom a candidate or issue should be 
presented.”67  Political strategy is exceptionally costly.68  However, the 
62 Behavioral Campaigns, supra note 21, at 687. 
63 See CAMPAIGN WARRIORS: POLITICAL CONSULTANTS IN ELECTIONS 2 (James A. Thurber 
& Candice J. Nelson eds., 2000) (discussing the importance of consultants for political 
campaigns). 
64 See LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON’T PANDER:
POLITICAL MANIPULATION AND THE LOSS OF DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS (2000) (describing 
the considerable resources invested in crafting persuasive messages). 
65 See LARRY J. SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING 
ELECTIONS 49-53 (1981). 
66 See Mary J. Culnan & Priscilla M. Regan, Privacy Issues and the Creation of Campaign 
Mailing Lists, 11 INFO. SOC’Y 2, 85-87 (1995). 
67 Id. (discussing the importance of the use of experts in product development and advertising 
for political campaigning). 
68 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
663, 684 (1997) (“Where does all this political money go?  The biggest expense is the cost of 
purchasing advertising time on television (though increasingly, political consultants take a hefty 
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value of effective techniques is indisputable.69
B.     Psychological Impacts 
Voters, like decisionmakers in other contexts, must make choices 
with limited information and under time constraints.  An inability to 
collect, sort, and analyze all relevant data leads voters to rely on 
cognitive and informational shortcuts, or heuristics, which allow voters 
to “keep the information processing demands of the task within 
bounds.”70  Individuals often also rely on social sources for both facts 
and opinions.71  As a result, voters rely on imperfect and incomplete 
information and tend to process that information haphazardly, leaving 
them vulnerable to manipulation by politically motivated actors.  A vote 
based upon incomplete information can be considered “accurate.”  The 
test is whether the vote cast is the same vote that would have been cast 
if complete information had been available.  To the extent that a 
citizen’s reliance on erroneous or misleading information and cognitive 
shortcuts results in a vote that is different from that which he or she 
would have cast with full information, the voter is deemed not fully 
competent, and the vote is “incorrect.”72
In summary, voters hold “inaccurate and stereotyped factual 
beliefs,” and they hold these beliefs “overconfidently [and] resist 
correct information, prefer easy arguments, interpret elite statements 
according to racial or other biases, and rely heavily on scanty 
information about a candidate’s policy positions.”73  A closer look at 
some of the specific cognitive traps relevant to voter decision-making 
can provide a glimpse into the potential for psychological manipulation.  
share).”); see also Linda L. Fowler, The Best Congress Money Can Buy?, 6 ELECTION L.J. 417, 
420 (2007) (discussing the rising costs of campaigning and the prominent role of consultants in 
crafting election communications). 
69 See James H. Kuklinski & Paul J. Quirk, Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, 
Heuristics, and Mass Opinion, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE 
BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 153, 181-82 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) (“We have cautioned 
against overly optimistic accounts of a politically competent, rational public.  Not only are 
citizens minimally informed, as nearly all scholars agree, but they are also prone to bias and error 
in using the limited information they receive.”). 
70 See Robert P. Abelson & Ariel Levi, Decision Making and Decision Theory, in 1(3) THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231-309 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1985). 
71 See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 
99 (1955) (for the proposition that decision-makers use shortcuts); see also BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (discussing empirical investigations of how human beings process 
information and make choices). 
72 See Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 69, at 156-57 (finding that the voting public is error 
prone); Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive 
Heuristics in Political Decision Making, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951, 966 (2001). 
73 See Kuklinski & Quirk, supra note 69, at 156. 
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For example, individuals can be manipulated by framing, availability, 
and emotional appeals.  These three areas are a small subset of a larger 
constellation of relevant cognitive and behavioral phenomena that can 
result in suboptimal decision-making. 
1.     Framing 
A simple change in how choices are presented, or “framed,” can 
influence a decision-maker’s preference for one option over another.74
In the framing context, syntax is a tool employed by clever 
communicators to craft listeners’ perceptions.  In fact, the potential for 
strategic use of this cognitive trick has been cited as a hallmark 
characteristic of framing.75  So powerful is the effect of the strategic use 
of frames that some have cautioned framing strategies “can become 
freewheeling exercises in pure manipulation.”76  Political scientists and 
historians have linked issue framing to successful attempts at shaping 
public support for everything from a particular political party77 to a 
specific military engagement.78
One of the most common types of framing used to persuade the 
public to endorse a candidate or issue is “valence framing,” which 
occurs when options are (misleadingly) depicted as diametrically 
opposed; one option is promoted as advantageous, while the other is 
intolerable.79  Another common tactic is to pair words or phrases that 
have certain established meanings with other concepts in order to create 
new understandings and associations.  A prime example is “clean coal.”  
74 See Eldar Shafir, Prospect Theory and Political Analysis: A Psychological Perspective, 13 
POL. PSYCHOL. 311, 313-14 (1992) (“Framing refers to the tendency of normatively 
inconsequential changes in the formulation of a choice problem to affect the ways people 
represent the problem and, consequently, their preferences.”); see also generally, Amos Tversky 
& Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 
(1981).  The effects of framing can be seen when two “logically equivalent (but not transparently
equivalent) statements of a problem lead decision makers to choose different options.”  Matthew 
Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 36 (1998). 
75 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 313, 317 (2006) (calling framing “the ability of someone who is propounding an option to 
present the option . . .  in such a way as to . . . make the option seem more or less desirable”). 
76 See Donald R. Kinder & Don Herzog, Democratic Discussion, in RECONSIDERING THE 
DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC 347, 363 (George E. Marcus & Russell L. Hanson eds., 1993). 
77 For an account of the framing effect at work in a presidential election, see Matt Bai, The 
Framing Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 17, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2005/07/17/magazine/17DEMOCRATS.html. 
78 See JEFFREY FELDMAN, FRAMING THE DEBATE: FAMOUS PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES AND 
HOW PROGRESSIVES CAN USE THEM TO CHANGE THE CONVERSATION (AND WIN ELECTIONS) 
(2007) (discussing George W. Bush’s reference to “axis of evil” in speeches). 
79 See Irwin P. Levin, Sandra L. Schneider, & Gary J. Gaeth, All Frames Are Not Created 
Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 ORGL. BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 149, 150 (1998). 
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In other instances, framing is achieved by altering the presentation of 
numbers or percentages.  For instance, an advertising campaign might 
refer to a product as ninety-nine percent pure, as opposed to one percent 
impure.80  Responses to framing changes are so robust in human beings 
that some researchers have looked at the physiological basis for these 
responses and have discovered that the framing effect is associated with 
the amygdale, an area of the brain responsible for processing 
emotions.81
2.     The Availability Heuristic 
Ideas, events, and characterizations that are easily brought to mind 
are said to be “available.”  Empirical investigations of the availability 
heuristic reveal that subjects change their estimates about the likelihood 
of a danger materializing based upon the recency, frequency, and 
vividness of information about the danger.82  In particular, the perceived 
likelihood of events—particularly risky events or bad outcomes—
increases if the language used to describe these dangers is emotionally 
loaded.83  For example, prior to the terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Center on September 11, 2001, Americans ranked terrorism low on their 
list of priorities meriting governmental attention.84  More than a year 
after the attack of September 11, public polls indicated that Americans 
deemed the threat of terrorism to be the single most important problem 
facing the United States.  Even more interestingly, “fluctuations [in 
Americans’ concern about terrorism] closely track[ed] the frequency of 
television news stories concerning terrorism.”85
Campaign tactics often involve efforts to increase the cognitive 
availability of ideas that are advantageous to the candidate.  For 
example, advertising campaigns develop themes and use repetition to 
80 The classic slogan of Ivory Soap was “99 44/100 Per Cent. Pure.”  A 1907 advertisement 
using this slogan can be viewed at http://www.americanhistory.si.edu/archives/ 
Ivory/detail.asp?index=0207910005.jpg&startCount=5&skipNo=yes&skip_num=1&key=&subje
ct=&output=text&dates=&coll=&form_genre=. 
81 Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the Human 
Brain, 313 SCIENCE 684 (2006). 
82 See Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and Environmental 
Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2149 
(2009) (“The availability heuristic is a widely-used mental shortcut that leads people to assign a 
higher likelihood to events that are readily ‘available’—events that are particularly likely to come 
to mind due to their vividness, recency, or frequency.”). 
83 Id.
84 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate 
Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 532 (2007) (“[O]n September 10, 2001, terrorism was far 
from a high priority item for Americans—and . . . the year before the attacks, literally 0% of the 
public counted terrorism as the nation’s leading problem!”). 
85 See id. (internal citations omitted). 
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build a particular understanding of an issue.86  Campaign funds are first 
spent developing and testing advertisements that communicate simple 
messages in memorable ways.  Funds are then used to distribute the 
communication widely, preferably in a variety of formats.  Political 
psychologists have noted the effectiveness of such a strategy, finding 
that “information that is widely and repeatedly disseminated to the 
public stands a good chance of being absorbed (and retrieved later).”87
3.     The Role of Emotions 
Emotional appeals are a hallmark of political campaigns.88
Negative emotions such as fear, anger, and outrage are particularly 
prominent in political advertising, primarily because these emotions 
tend to influence choice.89  In the political marketplace, “negative” 
campaigning is commonplace, making this type of political 
communication one of the most prominent examples of an effort to 
harness the power of emotions.90  Political advertisements are 
particularly infamous for triggering fear in constituents.  One prominent 
example is the 1964 Lyndon B. Johnson advertisement entitled “Peace, 
Little Girl,” in which the reflection of an atomic mushroom cloud was 
portrayed as a reflection in the eyes of a small child.91  Because law-
makers have control over the exposure of citizens to various risks, the 
role of emotions in perceptions about risk becomes a central feature of 
political choice.92  As Dan Kahan notes: 
86 See Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Is Soft Money Here to Stay Under the “Magic 
Words” Doctrine?, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 37 (1998).  For further scholarship on 
informational and reputational cascades, see Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability 
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 708-09 (1999). 
87 Daron R. Shaw, A Study of Presidential Campaign Event Effects from 1952 to 1992, 61 J. 
POL. 387, 393 (1999). 
88 See generally TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: HOW EMOTIONAL 
APPEALS IN POLITICAL ADS WORK (2006). 
89 See Mary Frances Luce, Choosing to Avoid: Coping with Negatively Emotion-Laden 
Consumer Decisions, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 409 (1998). 
90 See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & SHANTO IYENGAR, GOING NEGATIVE: HOW POLITICAL 
ADVERTISEMENTS SHRINK AND POLARIZE THE ELECTORATE (1995); see also Lynda Lee Kaid & 
Anne Johnston, Negative Versus Positive Television Advertising in U.S. Presidential Campaigns, 
1960-1988, 41 J. COMM. 53, 53 (1991); see also generally Thomas J. Rudolph, Amy Gangl, & 
Dan Stevens, The Effects of Efficacy and Emotions on Campaign Involvement, 62 J. POL. 1189 
(2000) (noting that negative emotions can influence political involvement); Chris Weber, 
Exploring the Role of Discrete Emotions in Political Campaigns, available at
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/0/8/8/5/pages208851/p208851
-1.php. 
91 This advertisement can be viewed at: http://www.history.com/videos/campaign-spot-peace-
little-girl-1964#campaign-spot-peace-little-girl-1964 (last visited June 25, 2010). 
92 See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
741, 744-45 (2008) (footnotes omitted).  Much of the current work in this area is based upon that 
of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, who were pioneers in the movement to use emotion and 
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Distinct emotional states—from fear to dread to anger to disgust—
and distinct emotional phenomena—from affective orientations to 
symbolic associations and imagery—have been found to explain 
perceptions of the dangerousness of all manner of activities and 
things—from pesticides to mobile phones, from red meat 
consumption to cigarette smoking.93
While triggering fear in connection with specific political 
candidates may prove to be an effective political strategy, it is likely to 
result in suboptimal voter decisions by distorting or skewing voter 
perceptions.94
III. THE CASE FOR AN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
A.     The Special Nature of Corporations 
Without question, political candidates already exploit various 
features of human judgment and choice.95  However, candidate 
spending is different from corporate spending in a number of important 
ways.  First, the politician is directly answerable to the electorate for his 
or her political campaign communication because candidates are 
required to explicitly identify their sponsorship of an advertisement.  If 
the public objects to a candidate’s campaign message, voters can clearly 
identify the source of the message and can take whatever action they 
deem appropriate by expressing objections publicly or withholding 
financial and other support.  Second, due to the cap on contributions, the 
financial wherewithal of a candidate bears at least some relationship to 
his or her popularity.96  Third, a candidate’s spending is tied to the 
candidate’s ability to communicate positions and policy preferences to 
the American public. 97
culture to explain responses to risk and decision-making more generally.  See, e.g., MARY 
DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY (1992); MARY DOUGLAS &
AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by 
Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 4 
(1987). 
93 See Kahan, supra note 92, at 744-45. 
94 See generally KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, DIRTY POLITICS: DECEPTION, DISTRACTION,
AND DEMOCRACY (1992). 
95 See Behavioral Campaigns, supra note 21, at Section I.D (discussing historical examples 
of the use of psychological tactics during political campaigns). 
96 In Behavioral Campaigns, I argue that there are reasons to be concerned about unchecked 
spending, even if the spending is on the part of the candidate or political party.  Behavioral 
Campaigns, supra note 21.  However, the same social science based arguments pertaining to 
unchecked spending apply with more force when the spending is “under the table”—as is current 
independent spending—where there is virtually no accountability for the message.  Id.
97 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court stated that “it is of particular importance that candidates 
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While independent spending by corporations and unions may 
superficially appear to be similar to candidate spending, it lacks many 
of the safeguards that exist in the case of candidate spending.  After 
Citizens United, candidates who are particularly pro-corporation or pro-
Industry X will likely enjoy a considerable financial advantage over 
other candidates and the advantage will be unrelated to public support 
for that candidate.  Moreover, as empirical research has demonstrated, 
corporate financial muscle may in fact alter public preferences.  After 
all, successful corporations are experts when it comes to investing 
capital in a way that achieves maximum effectiveness.98
Corporations differ not only from candidates, but also from 
wealthy individuals.  While some individual citizens have tremendous 
financial resources to spend on political advocacy, they lack the special 
legal identity of the corporation.  Moreover, their interests are more 
diverse and are driven—at least in part—by human rather than business 
concerns.99 The special purpose and legal protections granted 
corporations raise particular concerns in the political sphere.  It is 
therefore difficult to understand Justice Kennedy’s claim that “by taking 
the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the Government 
deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to 
strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s 
voice.”100  Similarly perplexing is the majority’s assertion that it finds 
“no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the 
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”101
It is difficult to conceive of a way in which corporations can be 
characterized as “disadvantaged” or “disfavored.”  In fact, corporations 
enjoy numerous benefits that are not available to other persons.  As the 
have the unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently 
evaluate the candidates’ personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before 
choosing among them on election day.”  424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976).  There is no concomitant need 
for a corporation to communicate its views to the electorate in order for citizens to understand 
candidates’ positions on issues. 
98 See Brief for Am. Indep. Bus. Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee at 3, 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205) (“The governance system of such 
corporations is highly successful for the pursuit of profit . . . .”) (on file with Cardozo Law 
Review).
99 Hence, while corporations have a certain, specific, narrow set of concerns related to 
productivity and profits, wealthy individuals my be philanthropic, humanitarian, pro-
environment, pro-arts, or religious—values that corporations and unions are unlikely to espouse 
through support for political candidates. 
100 There are other issues germane to the treatment of corporations.  Justice Stevens points out 
that if “the identity of a speaker has no relevance to the Government’s ability to regulate political 
speech, [it] would lead to some remarkable conclusions, [for example] it would appear to afford 
the same protection to multinational corporations controlled by foreigners as to individual 
Americans: To do otherwise, after all, could ‘enhance the relative voice’ of some (i.e., humans) 
over others (i.e., nonhumans).”  Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 947-48 (2010) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49). 
101 Id. at 899 (emphasis added). 
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Austin majority pointed out, “[s]tate law grants corporations special 
advantages—such as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable 
treatment of the accumulation and distribution of assets.”102  Not only 
do corporations enjoy special treatment, but the corporation also must 
aim “to enhance the profitability of the company, no matter how 
persuasive the arguments for a broader or conflicting set of 
priorities.”103
Without doubt, the financial power of large corporations is 
breathtaking.  To provide some context: The total amount spent on all 
federal elections in the 2008 election cycle was just shy of $5.3 billion 
(for congressional and presidential races combined).104  Over roughly 
the same time period (2007-08), the profits for Exxon totaled $85 
billion.105  This means that in just two years, a single—albeit very 
large—corporation with clear policy preferences earns profits in excess 
of sixteen times the total expenditures of all federal elections for a 
single election cycle.  In an Op-Ed published by the Washington Post, 
Senator Russ Feingold wrote, “[the Citizens United] decision gives a 
green light to corporations to unleash their massive coffers on the 
political system.  The profits of Fortune 500 companies in 2008 alone 
were 350 times the entire amount spent on the last presidential 
election.”106  As one commentator has remarked, “[this] illustrates how 
easy it will be for one company, one industry, or the corporate class 
overall, to dominate the electoral discourse in the wake of Citizens 
United.”107
102 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United 
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  Justice Stevens foresees a special potential for corporate 
dominance because corporations “are uniquely equipped to seek laws that favor their owners, not 
simply because they have a lot of money but because of their legal and organizational structure.  
Remove all restrictions on their electioneering, and the door may be opened to a type of rent 
seeking that is ‘far more destructive’ than what noncorporations are capable of.  It is for reasons 
such as these that our campaign finance jurisprudence has long appreciated that ‘the ‘differing 
structures and purposes’ of different entities ‘may require different forms of regulation in order to 
protect the integrity of the electoral process.’”  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
103 Brief for Am. Indep. Bus. Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee on Supp. 
Question at 11, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205). 
104 The Money Behind the Elections, OpenSecrets.org: Center for Responsive Politics, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/index.php (last visited June 25, 2010). 
105 Steve Hargreaves, Exxon 2008 Profit: A Record $45 Billion, CNNMoney.com, Jan. 30, 
2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/30/news/companies/exxon_earnings/index.htm (last visited 
June 25, 2010). 
106 Russ Feingold, Op-Ed., Democracy Hurt by Citizens United Decision, WASH. POST, Jan. 
24, 2010, available at http://feingold.senate.gov/opinion/10/20100124.htm. 
107 Robert Weissman, A Disadvantaged Class? The Corporate Speech Index, 
CommonDreams.org, Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/02/12-8 (last 
visited June 25, 2010). 
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B.     A Fresh Look at Corruption 
The Court’s history of focusing on prevention of corruption or 
appearance of corruption as the only legitimate state interests justifying 
campaign funding regulation should elicit a thorough examination of the 
definition of corruption.  “Corruption” is in the eye of the beholder, and 
many varied and nuanced definitions of corruption have been offered.  
In the earlier Behavioral Campaigns article, I argued for a new 
conceptualization of “corruption,” applying social science research and 
theory to reveal the potential for campaign communication to 
manipulate—rather than inform—the electorate.  I noted: 
Political advertising and other forms of propaganda are entrenched 
and vital aspects of the American political process, and political 
candidates inevitably tout their experience, promote their policies, 
and attack their opponents.  However, while vigorous debate and 
self-promotion are vital elements of the American political process, 
temperance and egalitarianism are crucial as well.  In order for a 
government to operationalize democratic principles, it must place 
reasonable constraints upon a variety of institutions . . . that might 
otherwise undermine objectives of self-governance.108
In articulating an appropriate place for governmental oversight in 
this area, it may be instructive to consider the role of courts in contract 
law.  Just as parties to a contract must understand the terms and enter 
freely into the agreement, there should be at least a modicum of 
protection for citizens who are shopping for a political candidate 
empowered to create laws that profoundly affect those citizens.  After 
all, “[t]he legitimacy of a government rests upon the inclusion and
informed consent of its members of society.”109
Ironically, in advancing his anti-regulation position, Justice 
Kennedy lays claim to the informed public argument.  Kennedy takes a 
page from Buckley, asserting that “[i]n a republic where the people are 
sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among 
candidates for office is essential.”  This claim has rhetorical power 
because few would contest it.  However, Justice Kennedy’s reliance on 
the informed citizenry rationale ignores the fact that proponents of 
corporation spending restrictions have precisely the same concern.  Like 
Justice Kennedy, advocates of reasonable corporate restraints are 
concerned about vesting ultimate power over elections to the people.110
108 Behavioral Campaigns, supra note 21, at 742.
109 See J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government ii, 4; viii, 95, reprinted in READINGS IN 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 530, 551 (Francis W. Coker ed., 1938). 
110 Admittedly, pro-restraint advocates are less concerned about protecting corporations than 
the Citizens United majority. 
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Hence, this is not a dispute concerning the value of democratic elections 
or whether the American citizenry should be free to choose their 
representatives.  Instead, the controversy lies in how to best create and 
maintain a political environment that maximizes the ability of the 
citizenry to make informed decisions.
In order to maintain a knowledgeable electorate, it is vital to 
examine social science data illustrating the potential for strategic 
communication to influence citizens to vote against their self interest.111
The data suggests that political communication can frustrate voter 
understanding.  This evidence should be in the record before the Court 
and should be given careful attention.  After considering the empirical 
evidence, the Court may find that under some circumstances, 
countervailing forces adequately neutralize manipulative 
communication.  Campaign discourse and debate may reveal 
misleading, biased, or skewed information.  Even when the bulk of 
resources favor a particular candidate, alternative perspectives and a 
range of opposing interests may adequately protect voters from the most 
egregious forms of hoodwinking.112
Unfortunately, however, the majority in Citizens United does not 
appear to have conducted an analysis of the realities of independent 
spending advocacy, and the implications of opening the door to 
corporate involvement in this activity.  Justice Stevens writes: 
The Court’s facile depiction of corporate electioneering assumes 
away all of these complexities.  Our colleagues ridicule the idea of 
regulating expenditures based on ‘nothing more’ than a fear that 
corporations have a special ‘ability to persuade,’ as if corporations 
were our society’s ablest debaters and viewpoint-neutral laws such as 
§ 203 were created to suppress their best arguments.  In their haste to 
knock down yet another straw man, our colleagues simply ignore the 
fundamental concerns of the Austin Court and the legislatures that 
have passed laws like § 203: to safeguard the integrity, 
competitiveness, and democratic responsiveness of the electoral 
process.113
In light of the growing mountain of evidence that voters can be and are 
misled, misinformed, and misdirected by certain types of prevalent 
communication, it behooves the Court to listen to Congress and to think 
carefully about what it is unleashing on the American public in the 
111 To the degree that a voter’s reliance on limited information and cognitive heuristics results 
in a vote that is different from that which he or she would have cast with full information, the 
voter is not competent, and the vote is “incorrect.”  Lau & Redlawsk, supra note 72, at 966 (“In 
fact, heavy reliance on political heuristics actually made decision making less accurate among 
those low in political sophistication.”). 
112 The Court has held that equalizing speech opportunities is not an interest that is sufficient 
to merit restraints on political speech. 
113 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 977 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
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name of “informed” decision-making. 
C.     Speech Concerns 
Although Justice Kennedy argued briefly that “independent 
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption,”114 he spent most of his 
opinion extolling the virtues of unencumbered speech.  The Citizens 
United majority opinion left open the question of what type of interest 
might ever give rise to constitutionally defensible limitations.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the right of free speech is not inviolate.  
After all, speech is limited in any number of circumstances where a 
compelling governmental interest has been shown.115  Perhaps in spite 
of the empirical evidence, the majority will remain unconvinced that 
these cognitive and behavioral patterns are present in the voting context 
and that funding influences them.  Alternatively, the majority might 
believe that protecting speech is so important that no other rationale 
would justify campaign spending limits.  This still leaves the possibility 
that the Citizens United majority would allow restrictions on the 
political speech of some, if and only if such an imposition was necessary 
to protect the First Amendment right of others.  Assuming without 
deciding that only the most narrow of rationale will suffice, we are left 
with a question of fact: Does lifting the corporate expenditure restriction 
for electioneering communications threaten the right of free speech for 
non-corporate citizens?
In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy writes that voters are adults 
who “must be free to obtain information from diverse sources . . . .”116
This implicates two assumptions.  The first assumption is that 
corporations are “diverse;” the second is that restricting corporate 
political speech is harmful to the recipient of the speech.  With respect 
to the issue of corporate diversity, clearly there are aspects of 
114 Id. at 909. 
115 In fact, Justice Kennedy’s opinion lists cases in which the Court has upheld restraints on 
speech where it found a compelling governmental rationale.  See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (protecting the “function of public school education”); Jones 
v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 
U.S. 817 (1974)) (furthering “the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system”); 
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (quoting United States v. Priest, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344 
(1971)) (ensuring “the capacity of the Government to discharge its [military] responsibilities”).  
Not to be outdone, Justice Stevens also points out that the government “routinely places special 
restrictions on the speech rights of students, prisoners, members of the Armed Forces, foreigners, 
and its own employees.  When such restrictions are justified by a legitimate governmental 
interest, they do not necessarily raise constitutional problems.”  Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 945 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
116 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. 
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corporations that are diverse.  They vary in size, in resources, and in 
what they produce.  However, it is not their diversity that has caused 
lawmakers at the state and federal level to repeatedly pass legislation to 
regulate their political spending, nor is it their varied character that 
persuaded the majority in Austin and again in McConnell to uphold 
these regulations.  Rather, it is the particular features common to 
corporations that cause unease.  Concerns include the fact that 
corporations exist for the singular purpose of generating revenue, and 
they do not have values and ideals.  Corporations lack compassion and 
the desire to protect and nurture today’s world for the benefit of future 
generations.117  In addition, corporations enjoy special protections not 
shared by individual members of society, as mentioned above.118
The second implication of Justice Kennedy’s quote, and a theme of 
the majority opinion, is that the threatened right belongs not only (and 
perhaps not primarily) to corporations, but also to voting adults who 
otherwise would be “free to obtain”119 information from corporations.  
In this vision of the voter, he or she actively seeks information from 
corporations and suffers when regulations interfere with these efforts.  
Justice Kennedy is relying on a dual-protection notion of the First 
Amendment right of free speech: The right of the speaker to express 
views and to be heard, and the right of the recipient to gain access to the 
speakers’ communication. Justice Kennedy’s rationale in Citizens 
United is based in large part on protecting the recipients of political 
advocacy.  Other members of the majority in Citizens United have 
expressed similar concern for protecting recipients of campaign 
speech.120
While some have characterized the Citizens United opinion as a 
debate between a pro-corporate majority and an anti-corporate dissent, 
this is an unfair characterization of both sides.  In fact, much of the 
dispute centers on how best to protect the public.  Justice Kennedy 
writes: “The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use 
information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-
government and a necessary means to protect it.”121  Justice Stevens 
counters: “The Court’s blinkered and aphoristic approach to the First 
117 Individual citizens who own, manage, and are employed by corporations do possess these 
qualities, but they are free to spend without restriction. 
118 See supra Part III.A. 
119 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (emphasis added). 
120 Scalia, who voted with the majority, expressed a similar concern for protecting the 
recipient of communication when, during oral argument, he asked, “Mr. Stewart, do you think 
that there’s a possibility that the First Amendment interest is greater when what the government is 
trying to stifle is not just a speaker who wants to say something but also a hearer who wants to 
hear what the speaker has to say?”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (No. 08-205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/08-205.pdf. 
121 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. 
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Amendment may well promote corporate power at the cost of the 
individual and collective self-expression the Amendment was meant to 
serve.”122  Justice Kennedy retorts that, in the words of Stanley Fish, 
voters “are not to be schooled by a government that would protect them 
from sources it distrusts.”123  Justice Stevens’ rejects the majority’s
notion that it is impossible to have too much speech, classifying the 
majority’s viewpoint as a “proposition with undeniable surface appeal 
but little grounding in evidence or experience,” because “[i]n the real 
world, we have seen, corporate domination of the airwaves prior to an 
election may decrease the average listener’s exposure to relevant 
viewpoints, and it may diminish citizens’ willingness and capacity to 
participate in the democratic process.”124
The Justices who make up the Citizens United majority have the 
power and the purpose to shape campaign funding in monumental ways 
over the next several decades.  Their belief that unfettered corporate 
campaign speech benefits the electorate will drive future campaign 
finance Court decisions.  The accuracy of this supposition is amenable 
to empirical analysis.  Careful questions should be asked about the 
effects of speech on the recipients in light of available data.125  If more 
speech consistently results in a greater variety of viewpoints and 
increased access to accurate information and honest debate, the interests 
of listeners are best served by fewer restrictions on speech.  If, however, 
Stevens is correct that “flooding the airwaves with slogans and sound-
bites may well do more to obscure the issues than to enlighten 
listeners,”126 and if financial giants with deep pockets and interests of 
limited value to the public at large127 will interfere with the public’s 
ability to hear all viewpoints and get accurate information, then 
restrictions might well be appropriate. 
Citizens United might also interfere with speech by privileging 
122 Id. at 977 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Commentator Stanley Fish characterizes Stevens’ 
concern this way: “Stevens is worried—no, he is certain—that the form of speech Kennedy 
celebrates will corrupt the free flow of information so crucial to the health of a democratic 
society.”  Posting of Stanley Fish to Opinionator, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com (Feb. 1, 
2010, 19:30 EST) [hereinafter Posting of Stanley Fish]. 
123 Posting of Stanley Fish, supra note 108 (interpreting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 
(“[I]t is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain 
information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes.”)). 
124 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
125 “The majority seems oblivious to the simple truth that laws such as § 203 do not merely pit 
the anticorruption interest against the First Amendment, but also pit competing First Amendment 
values against each other.”  Id. at 976 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
126 Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2778 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
127 “Existing rules already give corporations the ability to speak on the issues that matter to 
them.  Thus, the primary effect of overruling Austin or McConnell would be to promote political 
rent-seeking, not genuine expression of ideas.”  Supp. Brief for Comm. for Econ. Dev. as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellee, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1677664
WILSON.31-6 8/9/2010 11:34:12 PM 
2388 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:6 
certain types of speech at the expense of other types of speech.  If some 
voices speak so “loudly” that others are effectively rendered silent, this 
should trouble a majority obsessed with preventing the “chill” of 
political speech.128  Large corporations have the financial advantage 
necessary to gain a competitive edge over other voices in the months 
leading up to an election.129  The Austin Court’s unease with “corporate 
domination” of political elections relates to the goal of safeguarding 
First Amendment values by preserving some space in the political 
“marketplace.”  The numerous advantages enjoyed by corporations “not 
only allow corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation’s 
economy, but also permit them to use ‘resources amassed in the 
economic marketplace’ to obtain ‘an unfair advantage in the political 
marketplace.’”130
Empirical evidence provides support for this aspect of the pro-
speech rationale.  The resources spent on advocacy do more to create 
vast quantities of speech; a substantial portion of funding goes directly 
to developing communication that obscures and disables conflicting 
messages.  Evidence that voters rely heavily on cognitive shortcuts 
suggests that they only actually consider a subset of all relevant 
speech.131  The most influential communication is most likely 
characterized as crafty rhetoric and strategically targeted messages.  As 
one scholar has noted, “the tendency of voters to rely on less than 
perfect information and to process that information in a relatively 
cursory way means that the decision-making process is particularly 
vulnerable to manipulation . . . .”132  As a result, “[c]orporate wealth can 
unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of 
independent expenditures, just as it can when it assumes the guise of 
political contributions.”133
128 The notion that certain types of particularly manipulative speech can interfere with other 
speech is different from the idea that all voices should have access to precisely the same 
resources.  Concerns about the special character and advantages of corporations should not be 
confused with a general equalizing rationale, which was rejected in Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
129 That corporations can overwhelm other speakers is of particular concern if one agrees with 
the premise that “within the realm of [campaign spending] generally,” corporate spending is 
“furthest from the core of political expression . . . .”  FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 n.8 
(2003). 
130 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 
257 (1986)). 
131 See Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections, 40 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1996); Thomas E. Nelson & Zoe M. Oxley, Issue Framing Effects on Belief 
Importance and Opinion, 61 J. POL. 1040 (1999); Thomas E. Nelson et al., Toward a Psychology 
of Framing Effects, 19 POL. BEHAV. 221, 226 (1997). 
132 Behavioral Campaigns, supra note 21, at 689. 
133 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660. 
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D.     Small Corporations Are Not the Panacea  
to Political Campaign Ills 
Justice Kennedy argued that lifting the ban on corporate spending 
would give small corporations the power to push back against large 
corporate interests.  He asserted that “when [lobbying] is coupled with 
§ 441b, the result is that smaller or nonprofit corporations cannot raise a 
voice to object when other corporations, including those with vast 
wealth, are cooperating with the Government.”134  Without question, 
large corporations lobby elected officials tirelessly.135 Small 
corporations lack the financial wherewithal and political connections to 
exert the same kind of pressure.  It is difficult to see how supplying an 
additional way for corporations to gain an advantage by spending 
money will give small corporations more power vis-à-vis large 
corporations.  Opening the door for an additional avenue to exert 
influence over politics—which, like lobbying, selectively favors the 
most prosperous corporations—is likely to do just the opposite. 
Importantly, while the prevalence of the small business in the 
United States makes this type of enterprise important and deserving of 
protection, it does not make it financially or politically powerful.  
During the Citizens United oral argument, Justice Ginsburg made the 
point that while ninety-seven percent of corporations in the United 
States are small businesses, small businesses do not correspondingly 
contribute ninety-seven percent of the existent corporate campaign 
spending.  In the reargument of Citizens United, Justice Ginsburg noted 
that the expenditures that “count are the ones from the corporations that 
can amass these huge sums in their treasuries.”136  Even if small 
corporations can afford to devote resources to create campaign 
messages, they will lack sufficient funds for the strategy groundwork.  It 
would be an unusual “mom-and-pop” business that could afford to pay 
for consultants, marketing research, and broadcasting. 
This leads to the primary concern: Large corporations often have 
specific agendas of questionable public value, tremendous resources 
with which to craft and deliver their messages, and a lack of opponents 
with similar political clout and financial resources.  Without credible 
opposition to reveal their machinations and launch counterattacks, large 
corporations operate unchecked.  Large corporate interests include, inter 
alia, less stringent environmental protection laws, caps on products 
134 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010). 
135 Brief for State of Montana et al. as Amici Curiae Addressing June 29, 2009 Order for 
Supp. Briefing and Supporting Neither Party at 19, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205). 
136 Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), available 
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-205[Reargued].pdf. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1677664
WILSON.31-6 8/9/2010 11:34:12 PM 
2390 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 31:6 
liability awards, tax breaks for businesses, and fewer employee 
protection laws.  To the extent that small businesses do not share those 
goals with big businesses (in spite of membership in a common 
industry), they are unlikely to be able to launch an effective propaganda 
effort to counteract those of large corporations.  Small corporations are 
relatively powerless against large corporations not only because they are 
at a significant disadvantage financially, but also because they face 
various obstacles to effectively organizing and consolidating resources 
to achieve a common goal.  The position of the small business in 
politics is somewhat similar to that of the individual voter, because 
“[w]hen large numbers of citizens have a common stake in a measure 
that is under consideration, it may be very difficult for them to 
coordinate resources on behalf of their position.”137
CONCLUSION
In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt wrote, “[a]ll contributions by 
corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose 
should be forbidden by law.”138  The American public appears to share 
this sentiment.  In a recent poll, an overwhelming majority of 
respondents indicated approval of restrictions on spending for 
corporations and unions.139  These same respondents place a higher 
priority on regulating corporate and union spending than on protecting 
the right to free speech.140  In contrast to the Citizens United majority, 
the American public supports limitations on free speech in the interest 
of combating dangers posed by unchecked corporate election spending.  
Rather than wanting to “be free to obtain information” from 
corporations, the public appears to be deeply distrustful of specific 
sources of communication—so much so that voters would prefer 
137 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
138 United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957).  
139 One poll revealed that “Americans of both parties overwhelmingly oppose a Supreme 
Court ruling that allows corporations and unions to spend as much as they want on political 
campaigns . . . .  Eight in ten poll respondents say they oppose the high court’s Jan. 21 decision to 
allow unfettered corporate political spending, with sixty-five percent ‘strongly’ opposed.  Nearly 
as many backed congressional action to curb the ruling, with seventy-two percent in favor of 
reinstating limits.”  Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on 
Campaign Financing, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html.  Another poll revealed that sixty-one 
percent of Americans think the government should be able to limit the amount of money 
individuals can contribute to candidates, while seventy-six percent think the government should 
be able to limit the amount corporations or unions can give.”  Lydia Saad, Public Agrees With 
Court: Campaign Money is “Free Speech,” GALLUP, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/ 
poll/125333/Public-Agrees-Court-Campaign-Money-Free-Speech.aspx?CSTS=alert). 
140 Saad, supra note 139. 
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governmental interference.141  Citizens may perceive that they already 
are exposed to much of the corporate speech that is specifically 
protected and promoted by Citizens United, and they may want less, not 
more of this type of communication.142
Some congressional leaders seem to understand the public 
sentiment and are moving quickly to limit the impact of Citizens 
United.143  On February 11, 2010, Senator Charles E. Schumer of New 
York and Representative Chris Van Hollen of Maryland introduced a 
bill that would increase disclosure requirements and compel companies 
to inform shareholders about political spending, requiring corporate 
chief executives to appear in any political advertising funded by their 
companies.144  Lawmakers would also ban companies with more than 
twenty percent foreign ownership from participating in U.S. elections.  
The bill would exclude government contractors and bank bailout 
recipients as well as corporations having a board of directors with a 
majority of foreign nationals.  Additionally, the new law would require 
corporations to set up political funding accounts and to report political 
spending to the FEC.145
Whether voters are informed or misinformed depends largely upon 
how they get their information and from what types of sources.  When 
information originates from a variety of sources, and when the 
communication represents a range of interests and perspectives, voters 
141 A poll taken after the Citizens United opinion asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of the 
Supreme Court’s decision that allows corporations to spend on behalf of candidates in elections?”  
Respondents indicated general disapproval of the decision: seventeen percent approved, sixty-
eight percent disapproved, and fifteen percent were unsure.  Even the group most supportive of 
the decision—the Republicans—were overwhelmingly against corporate spending: twenty-two 
percent in favor and sixty-five percent against. Pew Research Center Poll, 
http://www.pollingreport.com/politics.htm (last visited June 25, 2010). 
142 One law scholar recently described the “reality” in these terms: 
The truth is that large corporate entities already dominate the conversation.  They are 
our employers, our suppliers and our service providers.  Through the revolving door 
of government, their leaders take up key positions in administrative agencies.  They 
tirelessly lobby elected and appointed officials.  They hire legions of attorneys to 
bring lawsuits to overturn statutes and regulations that cut into their profits.  And, of 
course, they spend hundreds of billions of dollars each year on advertising and 
marketing to make sure that everyone gets the message. 
Adam Benforado, Letter to the Editor, The Power of Money in Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 
2010, at A18. 
143 “If we don’t act quickly, the court’s ruling will have an immediate and disastrous impact 
on the 2010 elections,” said Senator Charles E. Schumer, shortly after the Citizens United opinion 
was issued.  Dan Eggen, Democrats Suggest Ways to Curb Companies’ Campaign Spending, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/02/11/AR2010021102678.html. 
144 See id.
145 See id.; see also Jess Bravin & Brody Mullins, New Rules Proposed On Campaign Donors, 
WALL. ST. J., Feb. 12, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487033829045750 
59941933737002.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines; Kenneth P. Vogel, Dems Try to Blunt 
SCOTUS Decision, POLITICO, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/ 
32839.html. 
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not only are exposed to different viewpoints, but they are also aware 
that there are alternative positions.  As the Justices are well aware, 
diversity of opinion is vital to truly democratic elections.  Justice 
Kennedy writes, “it is inherent in the nature of the political process that 
voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in order 
to determine how to cast their votes.”146  Where Justice Kennedy and 
his colleagues in the majority err is with respect to their vision of how to 
achieve diversity of voice and perspective.147
In a concurring opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government 
PAC, Justice Breyer determined that the campaign finance context is “a 
case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the 
legal equation.  For that reason there is no place for a strong 
presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to 
accompany the words ‘strict scrutiny.’”148  The interest referenced is the 
protection of a neutral voting environment in which there is reasonable 
(if not equal) room for those with viewpoints, but not financial fortunes 
to speak and to be heard.  Justice Kennedy’s point in Citizens United
that “[s]peakers have become adept at presenting citizens with sound 
bites, talking points, and scripted messages that dominate the 24-hour 
news cycle”149 is difficult to reconcile with a firm anti-regulation 
approach.  The fact that wealthy entities are already versed in the use of 
manipulative messaging highlights our need to increase governmental 
efforts to counteract this harmful influence.  Unfortunately, the Citizens 
United decision does more than to give corporate interests a place at the 
table.150  It gives them a place at the head of the table and a bullhorn. 
146 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010). 
147 Justice Stevens notes, “[a]s we have unanimously observed, legislatures are entitled to 
decide ‘that the special characteristics of the corporate structure require particularly careful 
regulation’ in an electoral context.  Not only has the distinctive potential of corporations to 
corrupt the electoral process long been recognized, but within the area of campaign finance, 
corporate spending is also ‘furthest from the core of political expression, since corporations’ First 
Amendment speech and association interests are derived largely from those of their members and 
of the public in receiving information.’”  Id. at 947 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing FEC v. Nat’l 
Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209–10 (1982) and FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 161 
n.8 (2003)) (citation and footnote omitted). 
148 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
149 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 912. 
150 Prior to Citizens United, corporations already had many opportunities to communicate and 
influence elections in profound and substantial ways. 
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